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FTC V. SIMEON MANA GEMENT CORP.:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
NEED FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The constant flow of complaints, by politicians and citizens alike,
about bureaucracy and governmental red tape reflects a widespread feeling
that unnecessary delay is a major problem for administrative agencies
functioning at all levels of government.1 The complaints are not without
foundation. Enforcement proceedings before an agency or regulatory com-
mission can be complex, time-consuming affairs. 2 The problems which
result from delays in administrative procedure, however, go much deeper
than mere frustration over the passage of inordinate amounts of time.
Because of the long interval often required to complete full-scale enforce-
ment proceedings, agencies may be unable to prevent impending or con-
tinued violations of the statutes that define their subject matter jurisdiction.
To overcome the enforcement problems which may result from delay,
Congress has explicitly authorized several federal administrative agencies to
seek temporary injunctions, pending completion of final enforcement pro-
ceedings, against particular violations of the regulatory schemes they are
charged with implementing. 3 The motivating concern behind the enactment
of these provisions is to preserve the integrity of enforcement efforts by
blocking attempts by offenders to collect the spoils of their illegal practices
and disappear before the agency can complete enforcement proceedings.
4
Thus, the preliminary injunction derives its value as an immediate remedy
from the ease and speed with which it can be procured to prevent allegedly
illegal activity.
It follows that the efficacy of the preliminary injunction as an enforce-
ment tool will be largely determined by the showing which the courts
I. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, Carter's Position on Issues Designed for Wide Appeal, N.Y.
Times, June 11, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (noting one candidate's proposal that the federal bureaucracy
be streamlined).
2. See, e.g., I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.08, at 549-50 (1958); ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN Gov-
ERNMENT AGENCIES, app. G, at 327-74 (1941).
3. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 608(a)(6) (1970) (market administrator of the USDA); 15 U.S.C. § 53
(Supp. III 1973) (Federal Trade Commission); 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b), 78u(e) (1970) (Securities
Exchange Commission); 16 U.S.C. § 825m(a) (1970) (Federal Power Commission); 29 U.S.C. 99
160(j), (1) (1970) (National Labor Relations Board); 42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1970) (Atomic Energy
Commission [now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission]); 49 U.S.C. § 322(b)(1) (1970) (Inter-
state Commerce Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 1487 (1970) (Civil Aeronautics Board).
4. FTC v. Thomsen-King & Co.. 109 F.2d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1940).
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require the agencies to make before an application for such an injunction
will be granted. If the agency is required to meet a rigorous test before it can
obtain a preliminary injunction against an apparent statutory violation, long
periods of time may lapse before injunctive relief can be obtained on the
public's behalf; indeed, in some cases where it may ultimately prevail on the
merits, the agency may be prevented from obtaining any preliminary relief.5
The problem of delay inherent in a formal proceeding on the merits cannot
be circumvented through pursuit of temporary relief where such relief is
conditioned upon proof of likely success on the merits in the formal pro-
ceedings. Such a purportedly "preliminary" proceeding may be extremely
time-consuming, as evidence from both sides must be collected and
weighed. Statutory provisions authorizing preliminary injunctions will ful-
fill their purpose only where the injunction can be obtained from the courts
upon a more limited showing by the agency. 6
A further problem arises, however, when the conduct being regulated
involves elements of speech which may be entitled to first amendment
protection. With increasing frequency, federal administrative agencies are
being granted authority to regulate various aspects of commercial speech.
Deceptive advertising, 7 deceptive labor practices, 8 and fraudulent misrepre-
sentations concerning securities offerings 9 are only a few examples. To be
effective, these regulatory schemes require the same prompt enforcement as
other government programs. Yet the first amendment places an overriding
constraint on the government's authority to restrain speech, thereby com-
plicating the problem of determining when a preliminary injunction may
appropriately be granted.
This conflict between the need for rapid enforcement via the prelimi-
nary injunction and the first amendment's protection of speech was recently
considered by the Ninth Circuit in FTC v. Simeon Management Corp.'0
Relying on a dual rationale which focused on legislative intent and the first
amendment's applicability to commercial speech, the court of appeals held
that a temporary injunction could not be issued against deceptive advertising
under the Federal Trade Commission Act without a demonstration that the
FTC was likely to succeed on the merits and that the equities of the case
favored issuance of the injunction.
The purpose of this Note is to argue, through analysis of Simeon, that
the case was wrongly decided. Unless some greater showing is clearly
5. See, e.g., FTC v. American Medicinal Prod., Inc., 30 F.T.C. 1683 (S.D. Cal. 1940),
aff'd, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1943).
6. See notes 44-60 infra and accompanying text.
7. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).
8. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970).
9. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, id. §§ 78a-jj.
10. 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976).
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required by statute, a demonstration of a reasonable basis for the agency's
belief that its statute is being violated and that an injunction would be in the
public interest should be sufficient to justify issuance of a preliminary
injunction against commercial speech. The need for prompt administrative
enforcement of public policy, the legislative histories of the Federal Trade
Commission Act and similar statutory provisions, and the Supreme Court's
current position on the applicability of the first amendment to commercial
speech all commend this view.
SECTION 53(A) OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT AND
FTC v. Simeon Management Corp.
Under section 53(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the federal
district courts are authorized to issue, upon a "proper showing" by the
FTC, temporary injunctions against the dissemination of false advertise-
ments which are likely to induce the purchase of drugs, food or cosmetics,
whenever the Commission has "reason to believe" that such an injunction
would be in the public interest.11 Unfortunately, the statute does not articu-
late a clear standard for the district courts to use in determining whether a
temporary injunction should be granted. One reading of section 53(a)
suggests that the Commission must demonstrate only that it "has reason to
believe" that the statute is being violated and that the public interest would
be served by injunctive action. 12 Alternatively, the statutory phrase "upon a
proper showing" might suggest that a more stringent requirement has
been imposed on the Commission, since at common law the courts will not
grant a preliminary injunction unless the plaintiff has satisfied a test which
includes a demonstration of likely success on the merits.
13
11. (a) Whenever the Commission has reason to beieve-
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is engaged in, or is about to engage
in, the dissemination or the causing of the dissemination of any advertisement in
violation of section 52 of this title, and
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission
under section 45 of this title, and until such complaint is dismissed by the
Commission or set aside by the court on review, or the order of the Commission
to cease and desist made thereon has become final within the meaning of section
45 of this title, would be to the interest of the public,
the Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring
suit in a district court of the United States or in the United States court of any
Territory, to enjoin the dissemination or the causing of the dissemination of such
advertisement. Upon proper showing a temporary injunction or restraining order
shall be granted without bond. Any such suit shall be brought in the district in which
such person, partnership, or corporation resides or transacts business.
15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970) (emphases added). Section 45(a)(1) declares "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce" unlawful. Id. § 45(a)(1). Section 52(b) states that causing the
dissemination of any false advertisement is such an "unfair or deceptive act or practice in
commerce." Id. § 52(b).
12. See FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951), discussed at notes
21-22 infra and accompanying text; FTC v. Koch Laboratories, Inc., 38 F.T.C. 931 (E.D. Mich.
1942).
13. Generally, the courts will not grant a preliminary injunction to an agency without a
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The Simeon Decision
The latter, more stringent interpretation of section 53(a) was recently
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in FTC v. Simeon Management Corp. 14 There
the FTC had initiated proceedings for a cease and desist order, charging the
Simeon Corporation with false and unfair advertising in connection with its
use of certain drugs in its weight reduction clinics.' 5 Simultaneously, the
Commission applied to the district court for a preliminary injunction. 16 The
lower court denied the application on the grounds that the FTC was unlikely
to succeed on the merits of its administrative action against the corporation
and because the equities of the case did not favor injunctive relief. 17
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district judge was
correct in ruling that a "proper showing" under section 53(a) must include a
demonstration of both the likelihood of the FTC's ultimate success on the
merits and that the equities of the case balanced in favor of a grant of the
requested relief.' 8 Since the Commission had not met its burden in this
respect, the Ninth Circuit held that the injunction had been properly de-
nied. 19 The court of appeals explicitly recognized20 that the Seventh Circuit
had taken a contrary position many years earlier in FTC v. Rhodes Pharma-
cal Co. ,21 which held that section 53(a) required the Commission to show
only that it had "reasonable cause to believe" that a violation had taken
place.22 Nevertheless, it preferred the view articulated by the district court in
showing by it that: (1) it stands to suffer irreparable injury without such relief; (2) that it is likely
to succeed at a trial on the merits; (3) that the injury it would receive if relief were not granted is
greater than the injury others would suffer if it were granted; and (4) that the public interest
would be served thereby. See, e.g., SEC v. Senex Corp., 534 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir. 1976);
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
14. 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. The Simeon Corporation operated several weight reduction clinics in California. The
clinics advertised, in newspapers and magazines and on television, that their "Simeons"
weight-loss programs were effective, safe and medically approved. The "Simeons" method
consisted of a four- to six-week program of limited daily diets, medical counseling, and daily
injections of human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG). HCG is a prescription drug approved by
the FDA for some purposes, though not for weight reduction. The FTC contended that HCG is
not safe for older men because it might activate previously latent prostate cancer. Id. at 710,
714.
16. See FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
17. See id. at 699-700.
18. 532 F.2d at 713-14.
19. Id. at 714-17. The court refused to overturn as "clearly erroneous" the district court's
conclusion that the FTC's claims would not ultimately prevail. The Ninth Circuit pointed to
recorded testimony indicating that experts were split as to whether HCG would bring on
prostate cancer in older men. Id. at 715.
20. Id. at 712.
21. 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951).
22. Id. at 747-48. In Rhodes, the trial judge had denied an injunction because the verified
pleadings and affidavits presented "debatable questions," and where "the equities of the
complaint are fully and explicitly met by denial under oath, a preliminary injunction will not be
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FTC v. National Health Aids 3 that while the Commission's reasonable
belief may be sufficient to warrant application for an injunction, something
more must be demonstrated before it will be granted.24
The Ninth Circuit advanced two justifications for its adoption of the
stricter test: the legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act and
the first amendment's proscription of prior restraints on protected commer-
cial expression. In the succeeding pages, this Note will discuss the difficul-
ties with each of the Simeon rationales. The legislative history argument
will be examined first, since an understanding of the way in which the
statutory preliminary injunction functions undercuts the conclusion that it
imposes an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression.
25
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ARGUMENT
The key to the Simeon court's interpretation of the legislative intent
behind section 53(a) was a 1973 statute which added a new section 53(b) to
the Federal Trade Commission Act.26 The new section authorizes the FTC to
seek an injunction when it believes that there has been a violation of any
provision of law which it enforces. 27 Section 53(b) includes an explicit
definition of the burden the FTC must meet in seeking an injunction: the
Commission must show through a weighing of the equities and a demonstra-
tion of the likelihood of its ultimate success in the enforcement proceeding
that a temporary injunction would be in the public interest. 28 The court also
noted statements by the amendment's proponents in Conference Committee
which indicated that the standard explicated in section 53(b) was intended to
granted." Id. at 746. In reversing, the Seventh Circuit noted that while a balancing of equities
and a showing of likelihood of success on the merits might be properly required in a private suit
for a preliminary injunction, they were not required in a suit where the "public interest" was
involved. Id. at 747. See notes 44-48 infra and accompanying text.
The Rhodes litigation neatly illustrates the difference in focus taken by courts which
subscribe to different constructions of the "proper showing" required under section 53(a).
Under the stricter test utilized by the trial court, the district judge must evaluate the strength of
the agency's petition by balancing the claims of one opposing party against the other. Thus, a
full set of denials to the allegations of the complaint will place a heavy evidentiary burden on
the agency. On the other hand, where the required showing is only a reasonable basis for belief,
the court's focus will be primarily on the sufficiency of the agency's complaint as showing a
possible violation of the statute and only secondarily on the denials and defenses of the
respondent, which will be considered fully at the administrative proceeding. See FTC v. Koch
Laboratories, Inc., 38 F.T.C. 931 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
23. 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952). See also FTC v. American Medicinal Prod., Inc., 30
F.T.C. 1683 (S.D. Cal. 1940), aff'd, 136 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1943) (temporary injunction will not
issue where an answer and affidavits are filed denying the equities of the petition).
24. 108 F. Supp. at 346-47.
25. The first amendment argument is discussed at notes 75-134 infra and accompanying
text.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. III 1973).
27. Id.
28. See id.
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codify the decisional law on section 53(a). 29 The court therefore concluded
that Congress intended similar standards to govern the availability of tem-
porary injunctions under both sections. 30
The Ninth Circuit's argument in Simeon-that because Congress has
required the Commission to meet the stricter standard in its applications for
injunctions under section 53(b), the standard must be the same for applica-
tions under section 53(a)31-is a non sequitur. First, it is doubtful that the
interpretation of this existing statutory provision by the drafters of subse-
quent legislation is entitled to much weight in a judicial determination of the
statutory burden placed on the Commission. 32 Even if it were appropriate to
rely on the interpretation of subsequent legislators, however, no clear
expression of that interpretation can be gleaned from the legislative history
of the more recent statute. The Conference Committee's discussion of the
1973 amendment is confused at best: 33 the Conference Report bluntly
contradicts the language of the amended section itself34 and reflects a
perplexing lack of familiarity with previous judicial interpretations of sec-
tion 53(a).35
29. CONF. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2523, 2533. Curiously, in referring to the decisional law on section 53(a),
the conferees cited only FTC v. National Health Aids, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952)
(discussed in text accompanying notes 23-24 supra) and FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d
669 (2d Cir. 1963). The latter case, however, specifically declined to decide whether something
more than the Commission's "reasonable belief" must be shown under section 53(a). Sterling
held that the Commission had failed to show even a "reasonable belief" that the statute had
been violated and thus affirmed the denial of the injunction. The ambiguity of the Conference
Committee Report on this point is characteristic of the Report's entire treatment of the new
section 53(b). See notes 33-35 infra and accompanying text.
30. FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d at 712-13.
31. See id. at 712.
32. "Mhe views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent
of an earlier one." United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304,313 (1960). While the Ninth Circuit was
able to cite other statements by the Supreme Court that such after-the-fact expressions of intent
might be entitled to some weight, it overlooked the significance of the considerable lapse of
time involved in this case. The 1973 amendment adding the new section 53(b) was passed 35
years after the Wheeler-Lea Act, (see note 38 infra), which added the present section 53(a).
"[T]he views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many years before by
another Congress have 'very little, if any, significance.' "United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968) (citations omitted).
33. See FrC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1975),
noting that the Seventh Circuit's view that section 53(a) only requires a showing of reasonable
cause to believe was not refuted by "the somewhat ambiguous legislative history of the (1973]
amendment."
34. The new section 53(b) explicitly defines a "proper showing" in terms of a "weighing
[of] the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success." 15 U.S.C. §
53(b) (Supp. III 1973). Yet the Conferees stated that: "The intent of section 53(b) is to maintain
the statutory or public interest standard which is now applicable, and not to impose the
traditional equity standard of irreparable damage, probability of success on the merits, and that
the balance of the equities favors petitioner." CONF. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31
(1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2523, 2533.
35. According to the Conference Report, the "new language [of section 53] is intended to
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The better view is that since sections 53(a) and 53(b) are directed at
different subject matter areas of the Commission's jurisdiction, it need not
be assumed that the showings required by the two provisions are the same.
Since violations of the law concerning false advertising of food, drugs and
cosmetics have been and continue to be singled out from violations of other
statutory provisions enforced by the Commission3 6 -at least for purposes of
securing temporary injunctions-it is more reasonable to conclude that such
violations have been viewed differently by Congress, and as a result, that
the Commission's burden with respect to them has intentionally been made
lighter. 37 An examination of the legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Act
of 193838 suggests that the prevention of false and unfair advertising was a
matter of special importance to the Congress. 39 Moreover, it shows that
codify the decisional law of [National Health Aids and Sterling] and similar cases which have
defined the judicial role to include the exercise of such independent judgment." Id. It is
difficult to determine what the conferees meant by "the exercise of such independent judg-
ment." The phrase has taken on no special significance in the cases. In FTC v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 677 (2d Cir. 1963) it was stated only that a court's power to exercise
independent judgment in section 53(a) proceedings prevented it from providing a "rubber
stamp" for the FTC solely on the basis of the latter's "reason to believe." Further, the
Conference Report does not mention the view of section 53(a) taken by the Seventh Circuit in
FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951), discussed at notes 21-22 supra and
accompanying text. Another confused commentator has suggested that Congress may have
intended to require an intermediate showing somewhere between the reasonable-cause-to-
believe standard and the traditional requirements of equity. See Halverson, The Federal Trade
Commission's Injunctive Powers Under the Alaskan Pipeline Amendments: An Analysis, 69
Nw. U.L. REV. 872, 879-81 (1975).
36. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (1970) (making it unlawful to distribute false advertisement
likely to induce the purchase of a food, drug, device or cosmetic), with id. § 52(b) (declaring
dissemination of any false advertisement to be illegal as an unfair or deceptive act or practice
under section 45).
37. This is the view taken by the Seventh Circuit in FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg
Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (1975). In reversing a district court's denial of a temporary injunction,
the court held that:
Congress added subsection (b) in 1973, leaving subsection (a) unchanged. By provid-
ing the traditional equity standards. . . and the permissive 'may' in (b), while leaving
(a) without those standards and with its preemptory 'shall,' Congress indicated...
no intention that the judicial interpretations of (a) should be affected by the
amendment.
Id. at 488-89.
38. Act of March 21, 1938, 52 Stat. 111 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 52-58 (1970)). This statute
made two substantive additions to the Federal Trade Commission Act. First, it extended
section 5 of the FTC Act to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as well as unfair
methods of competition, thereby bringing wronged consumers and wronged competitors within
its protection. Second, it added the special provision against false advertisement of food, drugs,
devices and cosmetics, supplementing the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970). C. DUNN, WHEELER-LEA ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGISLATIVE
RECORD iii (1938).
39. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1937), quoted in C. DUNN, supra
note 38, at 168:
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false advertising of particular commodities-food, drugs and cosmetics-
was intentionally and purposefully singled out for immediate extirpation40
The legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Act is less helpful in reveal-
ing the particular burden which the 75th Congress intended to impose on the
FTC when it sought the newly authorized preliminary injunction. 41 An
explanatory comment by the bill's Senate sponsor indicates that the princi-
pal proponents of the Act intended the preliminary injunction to issue
whenever the FTC's complaint appeared "reasonable" on its face. 42 The
same conclusion is reached, however, without relying on the force of this
solitary statement. Discussions of the enforcement provisions of the statute
in congressional hearings and debates emphasized that the public need for
immediate relief from the effects of deceptive food, drug and cosmetic
advertising was a dominant concern. 43
[WMe cannot ignore the evils and abuses of advertising; the imposition upon the
unsuspecting; and the downright criminality of preying upon the sick as well as the
consuming public through fraudulent, false, or subtle misleading advertisements.
The need of amending the existing act to give the Federal Trade Commission
more effective control over advertising as an unfair practice, is urgent and manifest.
40. 83 CONG. REC. 3255-56 (1938) (remarks of Sen. Wheeler presenting the Conference
Report to the Senate):
The Federal Trade Commission has always had jurisdiction over false advertising of
food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, as well as over all other commodities ....
More stringent control over the advertising of these four commodities has been
provided because their use directly affects the consumer's health rather than his
pocketbook.
41. Recorded debates over the'Wheeler-Lea Act generally suggest that the only seriously
contested provision was that which vested jurisdiction over false food, drug and cosmetic
advertising in the FTC rather than the FDA. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REc. 393 (1938) (remarks of
Rep. Mapes).
42. In presenting the Conference Report on S. 1077 to the Senate, Senator Wheeler
commented that section 13 of the bill (now codified as section 53(a)):
authorizes the Commission to secure temporary injunctions restraining the dissemi-
nation or the causing of the dissemination of false advertisements pending the
issuance of complaints by the Commission and their review by the courts, whenever
the Commission has reason to believe that such injunctive relief is in the interest of
the public.
Id. at 3255 (emphasis added). Explanatory statements by the legislation's sponsors should be
accorded "substantial weight" in the interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Federal Energy
Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976); cf. NLRB v. Thompson Prod., Inc.,
141 F.2d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 1944) (interpreting the National Labor Relations Act through review
of legislators' comments during floor debates).
43. In hearings on an early bill which gave jurisdiction over false food, drug and cosmetic
advertising to the FDA, the head of that agency called the temporary injunction provision "one
of the most important sections of the act," since "by expediting action and suppressing
continued offenses" the public would be more adequately protected. Hearings on S. 1944
Before the Senate Commerce Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 604 (1933), quoted in C. DUNN,
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: A STATEMENT OF ITs LEGISLATIVE RECORD 1102
(1938). At least one legislator saw the enactment of section 53(a) as a way to meet the criticism
that the FTC could not "proceed swiftly to meet an emergency situation involving a menace to
life or health." 83 CONG. REc. 398 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece).
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The Preliminary Injunction and the Public Interest
Given this background, it simply is not reasonable to conclude that
Congress intended to condition the granting of a section 53(a) preliminary
injunction on the satisfaction of traditional equitable requirements. On the
contrary, it is generally accepted that where a statute specifically authorizes
a federal regulatory commission to apply to a district court for a preliminary
injunction, the propriety of and need for injunctive relief will be governed
by concern for the public interest.44 The "public interest" is established by
the substantive provisions of the particular statute which the agency en-
forces. 45 That public interest may include, as it does in the case of false
food, drug and cosmetic advertisement legislation, a need for effective and
immediate relief from the substantive evils outlined. Thus, a showing that
the statute is probably being violated should replace the various showings
generally required in equity practice,' including likelihood of success on
the merits and a favorable balance of the equities. Similarly, a showing of
irreparable injury should not be required since Congress, in passing the
statute, has arguably already concluded that a violation will cause irrepar-
able harm.47 An agency need only show that it has a reasonable or justifiable
belief that the public interest as declared by the statute has been violated. 48
44. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). In Hecht the Supreme Court held that a
district court judge was not required automatically to grant an injunction against violations of
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, even though section 205(a) of that Act
provided that where violations of the Act are established the court "shall" grant the injunction.
The Court ruled that the district judge's discretion under § 205(a) must be exercised in light of
the broad objectives of the Act. 321 U.S. at 331. See also Shafer v. United States, 229 F.2d 124
(4th Cir. 1956).
45. See SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318, 1324 (D. Minn. 1972).
46. It is generally stated that the purpose of a preliminary injunction in an action between
private parties is to maintain the status quo between them in order to preserve the court's ability
to render a meaningful decision on the merits. See, e.g., Meis v. Sanitas Serv. Corp., 511 F.2d
655, 656 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 110
(1973). Statutes authorizing government agencies to petition for temporary injunctive relief
against probable statutory violations contemplate a different role for the courts. It is the
agency's jurisdiction, not that of the court, which is to be preserved. The purpose is not so
much to preserve the ability to render a meaningful decision in a particular conflict as it is to
protect the broad interests of the public as declared by statute. Seen in this light, the court's
injunctive powers are an important implementing tool for the agencies. See Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944): "Court and agency are the means adopted to attain the
prescribed end, and so far as their duties are defined by the words of the statute, those words
should be construed so as to attain that end through coordinated action."
47. See, e.g., American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. United States, 105 F.2d 722, 725 (9th Cir.
1939); SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, 340 F. Supp. 1318, 1324 (D. Minn. 1972).
48. See Bowles v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143 F.2d 38,42 (7th Cir. 1944) (suit by OPA to
enjoin violations of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942): "[Ihe action of the court on a
motion for a preliminary injunction is not predicated upon an anticipated determination of the
issues of fact which may be involved in the case. . . . There need be only evidence tending to
make out a prima facie case."
Vol. 1977:4891
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
Analogous Statutory Provisions
Further support for this formulation of the FTC's burden in seeking a
preliminary injunction emerges from a survey of the showings required from
other federal agencies under analogous statutory provisions. The Labor-
Management Relations Act, for example, authorizes the National Labor
Relations Board to petition a federal district court for temporary injunctive
relief, pending final adjudication by the Board, when there is "reasonable
cause to believe" that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice as
defined by specific sections of the statute.4 9 Where a petition has been filed,
the district court is empowered to grant such injunctive relief "as it deems
just and proper. "50 This provision was intended to facilitate quick relief
where unfair labor practices threatened harm which the normal enforcement
procedures provided by the statute might not be able to prevent."' For
example, in Douds v. Milk Drivers Local 584,52 the district court granted
the NLRB a temporary injunction against a secondary boycott upon allega-
tions by the Board that daily delivery of milk to over 100,000 consumers
was being threatened.53 The only judicially imposed prerequisite to tempo-
rary injunctive relief under the National Labor Relations Act is a showing by
the Board that there is reasonable cause to believe that the Act has been
violated and that such relief is just and proper.54 No demonstration of the
truth of the factual charge or of the validity of underlying principles of law is
required; it need only appear that the charge is "substantial and not
frivolous. " 55
The preliminary injunction has also been utilized as a means of pre-
venting injury pending completion of administrative proceedings in another
historically important area of federal regulatory activity: the effort to elimi-
nate fraudulent securities transactions.5 6 Both the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorize the SEC to petition a district
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j), (1) (1970).
50. Id.
51. Douds v. Milk Drivers Local 584, 154 F. Supp. 222,234 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 534
(2d Cir. 1957).
52. 154 F. Supp. at 234.
53. Id. at 224.
54. See Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 242 F.2d 808, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1957);
Kennedy v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 108, 289 F. Supp. 65, 85 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
55. Schauffler v. Local 1291, International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 292 F.2d 182, 187 (3d
Cir. 1961).
56. Section 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970), and section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), constitute the backbone of this
effort. "The need for regulatory measures, and for the observance of high standards of
scrupulous conduct in this field for the protection of the public interest, has long been
recognized by statutory intervention . . . and by case law dealing with the elements of
fraudulent conduct in the sale of securities." SEC v. F.S. Johns & Co., 207 F. Supp. 566, 573
(D.N.J. 1962).
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court for temporary injunctive relief "whenever it shall appear" that viola-
tions of the statute have occurred or will occur. 57 Under both statutes, the
courts are to grant the injunction "upon a proper showing.' 8 But, as under
section 53(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the securities laws do
not set out criteria for determining whether a proper showing has been
made. Further, neither statute makes explicit reference to the agency's
"reasonable cause to believe." 5 9 Nevertheless, it has been consistently held
that the SEC's burden is met by a demonstration that it has reasonable cause
to believe a violation of either act has occurred and that the public interest
will be harmed unless an injunction issues. 60
A similar approach appears to characterize judicial interpretations of
preliminary injunction provisions in statutory schemes which bear on com-
mercial speech in a more indirect way than do the securities laws or the
Federal Trade Commission Act. An example is provided by the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935,61 which is the basis for federal regulation of the
trucking industry. The Act's regulatory plan is built on the requirements that
motor carriers obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity 62 and
that transport brokers (those who sell transportation services provided by
others) acquire brokerage licenses. 63 The statute authorizes the Interstate
Commerce Commission to apply to the courts for injunctive enforcement of
its provisions, or of any term of a certificate, against carriers and brokers. 64
Since brokers are forbidden to advertise or otherwise hold themselves out as
qualified to perform brokerage services unless licensed,65 ICC regulation via
the preliminary injunction may affect a "broker's" exercise of commercial
speech. Though there is no mention in the statute of the showing required of
the agency when an injunction is sought,66 and though the case law is
sparse, it seems clear that the agency will not be required to meet the
traditional equitable burden of showing a likelihood of success on the
merits. 67
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(e) (1970).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., SEC v. Globus Int'l Ltd., 320 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (action to
enjoin alleged violations of 1933 and 1934 Acts); SEC v. F.S. Johns & Co., 207 F. Supp. 566,
573 (D.N.J. 1962) (action to enjoin alleged violation of the 1933 Act).
61. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970).
62. Id. § 306.
63. Id. § 311.
64. Id. § 322(b)(1).
65. d. § 311(a).
66. See id. §.322(b)(1).
67. See ICC v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.D. 1941). Respond-
ent hauled freight between North Dakota and Montana without obtaining a certificate from the
Commission. During a series of proceedings before the agency to determine whether Consoli-
dated would be allowed to make the runs under the Act's "grandfather" provisions, the ICC
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It should be emphasized that the reasonable-cause-to-believe standard
emerges in each of these regulatory schemes only from a specific statutory
authorization of an agency to seek a preliminary injunction. 68 Thus, where it
is a private party who seeks temporary injunctive relief against violations of
specific statutory provisions, a more stringent showing has consistently been
required by the courts. 69 The result is the same where other elements are
varied. For the reasonable-cause-to-believe standard to apply, the agency's
application for a preliminary injunction must be specifically authorized by
statute and must be filed with the court pursuant to that statute. Accordingly,
where the SEC moves for temporary injunctive relief from violations of the
securities laws under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure70 rather than
under the specific provisions of the 1933 or 1934 Acts,71 it has been required
to demonstrate the likelihood of its ultimate success on the merits. 72 Similar-
ly, while it has been held that the federal courts have the "inherent power"
to grant a federal agency a temporary injunction where no specific statute
authorizes the agency to request such relief, 73 the agency will be required to
petitioned for a preliminary injunction. The court discarded respondent's defense that irrepar-
able harm had not been shown by holding that since the purpose of section 322(b)(1) was to
restrain actions declared by Congress to violate public policy, no allegation or proof of
irreparable harm was necessary. Id. at 656; accord, ICC v. All American Bus Lines, Inc., 22 F.
Supp. 525, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (ICC need not satisfy the ordinary prerequisites of injunc-
tive relief since such relief was specifically authorized by statute).
Injunctive enforcement of the Act from the private sector will be more difficult. See 49
U.S.C. § 322(b)(2) (1970). Private party plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must post security
with the court in such amount "as the court deems proper." Id. A further disincentive to
private injunctive enforcement has emerged from court holdings that such plaintiffs must allege
and prove the traditional equity requirements for injunctions. See e.g., Tri-State Motor Transit
Co. v. International Transport, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 479 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1973).
68. See, e.g., CAB v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 803, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
69. See, e.g., Sultan v. Bessemer-Birmingham Motel Assoc., 322 F. Supp. 86, 89
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (private party plaintiff must demonstrate likelihood of success on merits and
balance of equities favorable to temporary injunctive relief). See also note 67 supra.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
71. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(e) (1970).
72. See SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1386, 1390-91 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd sub nom. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974).
There, the SEC sought permanent injunctive relief against respondent's alleged violations of
the securities laws. The procedural setting for the attempt to get temporary injunctive relief in
this case was odd: the Commission apparently felt compelled to move for temporary relief
pending the court's (not the agency's) final decision as to permanent restraint. The court of
appeals subsequently questioned the district court's failure to consolidate the application for a
preliminary injunction with its hearing on the merits relative to the final injunction, as is
permissible under FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2). See 493 F.2d at 1030 n.2. Though peculiar, the case
clearly illustrates the point that an agency enjoys the benefit of the less demanding reasonable-
cause-to-believe standard only when seeking temporary relief pursuant to a particular statutory
provision.
73. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Atlantic & Gulf/Panama Canal Zone, 241 F. Supp.
766, 776-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (lack of specific statutory authorization did not preclude the
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meet the stricter burdens traditionally demanded at equity. 74
THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT:
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS AFFECTING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
As a second rationale for its decision in Simeon, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that a construction of section 53(a) which required only that the
FTC show reasonable cause to believe that the statute has been violated and
that the public interest would be served by an injunction would conflict with
first amendment protection of commercial speech. 75 The court reasoned
that, at 'least since Bigelow v. Virginia ,76 commercial advertising has
assumed a protected status under the first amendment; that "[w]hen poten-
tially protected speech is subjected to prior restraint . . . procedural
safeguards are vitally important"; and that the minimum safeguard needed
before an injunction could be granted in this context would be a required
showing of likely success on the merits and a favorable balance of the
equities. 7 7
The Supreme Court and Commercial Speech
The longstanding doctrine that commercial speech receives no first
amendment protection 78 has been virtually destroyed by two recent Supreme
Court decisions. In Bigelow v. Virginia,79 the Court struck down as uncon-
stitutionally applied a state statute which made it illegal to encourage, by
way of publication, the procurement of an abortion.80 The Bigelow Court
set forth a two-step test for determining the extent, if any, to which
commercial speech is protected by the first amendment. First, in order to
receive any protection, the advertisement must contain "factual material of
clear 'public interest"' 81 and must refer to or propose a transaction that is
Commission from seeking temporary injunctive relief, pending investigation and hearings,
against collection by steamship conference of a 10% surcharge on trips between U.S. and Latin
American ports).
74. Id. at 777.
75. FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1976).
76. 421 U.S. 809 (1975), discussed at notes 79-83 infra and accompanying text.
77. 532 F.2d at 713.
78. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In upholding a city ordinance
restricting the street distribution of commercial advertising matter, the Court stated: "We are
equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely
commercial advertising." Id. at 54.
79. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
80. The "Virginia Weekly" had published an advertisement pointing out the legality and
availability of abortions in the state of New York. As manager of the paper, petitioner was tried
and convicted pursuant to the Virginia statute. The conviction was struck down as an uncon-
stitutional application of the statute; the Court concluded that the state of Virginia did not have
a valid interest in regulating what its citizens heard and read about services in New York. Id. at
827-28.
81. Id. at 822.
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legal.8 2 Second, to determine the extent of protection, the first amendment
interest in protecting the challenged speech must be weighed against the
public interest purportedly served by the state regulation.83
One year later, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc.,84 the Supreme Court eliminated any
remaining doubts as to the first amendment's general protection of commer-
cial speech and made it clear that Bigelow had established a balancing test.
While the advertisement of legalized abortion in New York state which had
been at issue in Bigelow appeared to contain "factual material of clear
'public interest," '85 the advertisement before the Court in Virginia Pharma-
cy did no more than propose a purely commercial transaction-the purchase
of prescription drugs.86 The Virginia Pharmacy Court gave two reasons for
circumventing the "factual material of clear 'public interest' require-
ment.8 7 First, it properly noted that a consumer's interest in the flow of
commercial information might easily be as great as, if not greater "than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate.'"8 Furthermore, since the
82. Id. at 822-24. The Court was thus able to distinguish its results in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), see note 78 supra, and Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1974) (holding that no first amendment protection
was available for "help-wanted" advertising separated into sex-designated columns since such
advertising merely proposed a commercial transaction and since the underlying commercial
activity-use of an applicant's sex as a criterion of employment-was illegal).
83. 421 U.S. at 826. Since the Court denied that the state of Virginia had any valid interest
in the conduct it sought to regulate (see note 80 supra), it was able to avoid a more difficult
issue: while Bigelow makes it clear that speech will not be denied first amendment protection
solely by reason of its commercial character, it did not confront the question of how the
protection afforded advertising would be applied to activities which the states have a legitimate
interest in regulating.
84. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
85. 421 U.S. at 822.
86. 425 U.S. at 760-61. The case involved a challenge by a state consumer organization to a
Virginia statute which provided that a pharmacist is guilty of "unprofessional conduct" when
he ". . . (3) publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner what-
soever, any amount, price, fee . . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescrip-
tion." VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974). A finding of "unprofessional conduct" might in turn
result in the imposition of a civil monetary penalty against the pharmacist or revocation of his
license by the State Board of Pharmacy. Id. § 54-524.22:1.
87. The Court did not discuss the status of the latter half of the first test set out in
Bigelow-that the advertisement must refer to or propose a legal commercial transaction to
receive any first amendment protection. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. However, it
seems likely that advertisements of illegal commercial transactions remain unprotected by the
first amendment. The Court's utilitarian rationale for protecting commercial speech, discussed
at notes 88-89 infra and accompanying text, would clearly be inapplicable to advertisements
proposing illegal transactions. Cf. Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68
(1976) ("We have recently held that the First Amendment affords some protection to commer-
cial speech [citing Virginia Pharmacy]. We have also made it clear, however, that the content
of a particular advertisement may determine the extent of its protection").
88. 425 U.S. at 763. See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,314-15(1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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consumer's private economic decisions affect the overall allocation of the
nation's resources, "[iut is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in
the aggregate, be intelligent and well-informed. "89 Employing the balanc-
ing test suggested in Bigelow, the Supreme Court held that the justifications
offered by the state of Virginia" were insufficient to justify the impediment
to the flow of commercial information created by its statute. 91 Since the
public interest is best served by an uninhibited flow of commercial informa-
tion, any particular advertisement is entitled to first amendment protection
regardless of whether it contains factual material of clear public interest. 92
This broad endorsement of unimpeded public access to commercial
information is not without qualification. Virginia Pharmacy also clarifies
the scope of protection which the first amendment affords commercial
speech when such protection conflicts with historically recognized state
regulatory powers. 93 False or misleading speech still receives no first
amendment protection: 94 "[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise,
has never been protected for its own sake. 95
The Role of Procedural Safeguards
While recognizing the legitimacy of the government's interest in pre-
venting the occurrence and harmful consequences of untruthful speech, the
Supreme Court has required that safeguards be built into regulatory pro-
grams in order to minimize the possibility of unconstitutional regulation of
protected speech. 96 In the area of defamatory communications, for example,
89. 425 U.S. at 765. See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603-04 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring). It has been suggested that restrictions on the content of advertising
would have the "anti-competitive" effect of making it difficult for new firms in one industry to
mount imaginative advertising campaigns, would deprive society of a prolific source of popular
culture, and would limit an important source of revenue for the mass media. Developments in
the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1016 (1967).
90. The state of Virginia had argued that price advertising would adversely affect the
quality of service offered by practicing pharmacists by encouraging them to sacrifice careful
work in favor of cost-cutting techniques, to the possible detriment of consumer health; would
impair the profession's image, making it hard to attract new talent into the profession; would
inflate the cost of drugs to the consumer; and would destroy "stable pharmacist-customer
relationships" by encouraging price shopping. 425 U.S. at 768.
91. The Court was not convinced that the ban on price advertising contributed anything to
the maintenance of high standards of professional conduct not already guaranteed by other
forms of regulation. Id. at 768-70.
92. Id. at 761-62.
93. Id. at 771-72. This issue was left open in Bigelow. See note 83 supra.
94. See 425 U.S. at 771. The courts have consistently held that there is no constitutional
right to disseminate false advertisements. See, e.g., E.F. Drew & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 235 F.2d
735, 740 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 959 (1957).
95. 425 U.S. at 771. The Court also intimated that its decision would not impair efforts at
regulation of the broadcast media. Id. at 773.
96. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1973); Carroll v. President and
Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968).
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the Court has placed substantial limitations on legislative authority to permit
recovery against offending publishers and broadcasters. 97 This reflects the
Court's recognition that "factual errors are inevitable in free debate" and its
fear that imposition of liability for such assertions would unduly restrict
public discussion by inducing self-censorship. 98
The Court has not perceived any similar need to restrict the govern-
ment's efforts to control the problem of false or misleading advertising. 99
Though there is no justification for denying first amendment protection to
commercial speech, there are "common sense differences" between it and
other varieties of speech which suggest that a lesser degree of protection is
required to insure the flow of "truthful and legitimate" commercial infor-
mation. 10° In contrast to publishers and broadcasters who "must often
attempt to assemble the true facts from sketchy and sometimes conflicting
sources under the pressure of publishing deadlines," the truth of the asser-
tions contained in a commercial advertisement can often be more easily
verified by both the advertiser and the FTC. 11 Furthermore, commercial
speech is likely to be relatively durable, since repetitive advertising of some
sort is generally recognized as an important prerequisite to commercial
success. 102 Accordingly, regulation for false or misleading advertisements is
less likely to have a chilling effect on legitimate (that is, fully protected)
commercial speech.
One further fundamental difference between commercial and non-
commercial speech provides additional justification for requiring less pro-
cedural precaution in the government's regulation of commercial speech.
Non-commercial speech frequently involves an exposition of ideas-
97. The states may not allow recovery against publishers and broadcasters, in the absence
of their actual knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard for truth, for libelous statements
made about "public officials." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The same
limitation has been applied to libelous statements made about "public figures," see Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), though the breadth of that category remains
unclear. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 453-55 (1976); Note, Defamation, Privacy
and the First Amendment, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1016. Further, the Court has made it impossible for
the states to allow any plaintiff to recover presumed or punitive damages (as opposed to actual
damages which are supported by "competent evidence concerning the injury") where plaintiff
cannot prove actual knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard for truth. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1973). However delimited, New York Times remains a
restriction on the states' ability to award damages against publishers and broadcasters for libel
of certain persons where such an award would unnecessarily cramp the "uninhibited, robust"
debate on public issues that the first amendment was designed to protect. New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
98. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 777 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
99. See id. at 771-72 n.24 (majority opinion); id. at 776-77 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 771-72 n.24 (majority opinion).
101. Id. at 777 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 771-72 n.24 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at 771-72 n.24.
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political or religious commentary, for example-which is generally thought
to be the type of comminication the first amendment was originally de-
signed to protect. 103 Under one widely accepted view, the first amendment's
protection of speech is conceptually founded on the proposition that the best
test of truth is the power of an idea to gain acceptance in the intellectual
marketplace. 1 4 If not tampered with, these abstract market forces will
separate the true from the false. In the commercial setting, however, it is
products, not ideas, that compete. 10 5 Two corollaries follow. First, the fear
of the Constitution's framers that a system of prior restraints on expression
would be used to stifle unpopular ideas10 6 is unjustified in the marketplace of
goods and services. 107 While suppliers of goods or services may attempt to
eliminate competition from other sources, this simply is not a core first
amendment problem. The success or failure of a particular product is hardly
relevant to the first amendment's purpose of promoting robust and uninhib-
ited political discussion. 10 8 Second, to the extent that an advertisement
misrepresents what a product is or can do, it loses any worthiness of
protection under the amendment, 10 9 since it will to the same extent distort
the operation of the marketplace of ideas in favor of the misrepresented
product.
The BigelowNirginia Pharmacy Analysis Applied
An application of the analysis outlined by the Supreme Court in
Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy belies the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
the first amendment requires an agency to show more than reasonable cause
to believe that a violation has occurred before a temporary injunction can be
granted. As has been shown, the government's interest in stifling false and
misleading advertising is legitimate and strong. 110 Congress' power to
utilize its authority over the mails and interstate commerce to protect the
public against fraud is firmly established.' But this strong public interest in
103. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
104. E.g., id. at 270. This view received its classic statement in Justice Holmes' dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
105. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 780-81 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
106. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713, 716 (1931).
107. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770-71 (1976); cf. id. at 778 n.3 (Stewart J., concurring).
108. See note 103 supra and accompanying text.
109. See Developments in the Law, supra note 89, at 1030.
110. "ETihe elimination of false and deceptive claims serves to promote the one facet of
commercial price and product advertising that warrants First Amendment protection-its
contribution to the flow of accurate and reliable information relevant to public and private
decisionmaking." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 781 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). See notes 36-43 supra and accompanying
text.
111. E.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948).
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preventing commercial frauds of all sorts must be juxtaposed against the
particular means chosen to combat their occurrence.
The crucial question at this point is the extent to which a particular
regulatory system chills or in some way restricts the exercise of protected
rights of communication. As noted, commercial speech possesses a quality
of durability in spite of regulation which other varieties of speech may not
possess. 112 Nonetheless, the particular form which the regulation takes may
be as important as the nature and characteristics of the type of communica-
tion being regulated.
In Simeon, the Ninth Circuit suggested that since a preliminary injunc-
tion of false advertising might be conceptualized as a prior restraint of
expression, the section 53(a) injunction procedure will be burdened with a
heavy presumption against its own constitutional validity. 113 This is a
problem of much significance, as the rule against prior restraints is at the
heart of first amendment protection of expression." 4 Though some broad
exceptions have been developed, 115 prohibitions against publication without
prior administrative approval or censorship have generally been held unen-
forceable as violations of the first amendment. 116 While most proceedings
for injunctive relief are subject to the general prohibition against prior
restraints, some categories fall within recognized exceptions."17
112. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
113. 532 F.2d at 713; see Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
181 (1968). See also Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
114. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938); Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
115. Licensing systems have been upheld where the discretion of the issuing official is
limited to matters of time, place, and manner of communication. See, e.g., Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). The courts are also less likely to find an invalid system of prior
restraints where the subject matter of the communication is not protected by the first amend-
ment or is expressly illegal. Thus, in the context of obscene publications, which are unprotected
by the first amendment, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), it has been held that not
all systems of prior administrative censorship will violate the amendment. See Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (upholding a municipal ordinance requiring submission of
all motion pictures for examination or censorship prior to their public exhibition and forbidding
such exhibition where certain standards were not met). Similarly, federal statutes which
authorize the Postmaster General to forbid delivery of mail and payment of postal money
orders to any person found, "upon evidence satisfactory" to him, to be conducting a "scheme
or device for obtaining money. . . through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses
... , " 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1970), have been upheld against attacks that they were invalid
systems of prior restraint on private communications. See Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc.,
333 U.S. 178 (1948).
116. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down a city ordinance which
barred unlicensed door-to-door communication; licenses were available only from local police
who possessed broad discretion under the statute to determine what types of literature could be
distributed and who could distribute it).
117. In Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), for example,
the Supreme Court held that issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order against the
holding of a protest meeting by a white supremacist group violated the first amendment. The
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The procedures for obtaining temporary injunctions against fraudulent
commercial activities under the Federal Trade Commission Act and similar
provisions do not fall within the category of prior restraints and, before
Simeon, had not been treated as if they did by the Ninth Circuit. While its
conceptual boundaries are somewhat unclear, 18 the prior restraint doctrine
seems best explained and understood in terms of the political milieu of
another century. 119
A prior restraint is the partial or complete prevention of publication
imposed by an executive official. 120 However, the issuance of an injunction,
under section 53(a) for example, is the result of an adversary judicial
proceeding, not the decision of an executive official. Further, the restraint
under such provisions will take the form of subsequent punishment for
contempt of a court order, not actual pre-publication censorship. 12' As a
Court found that the ex parte character of the proceeding, at least where no effort had been
made to notify petitioners, was fatal. Id. at 181-82.
Compare Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951). In that case the
appellant newspaper publisher had enjoyed a substantial monopoly over the local dissemination
of news and over local advertising. When a competing radio station was established, the
publisher refused to accept advertising from those who also advertised over the radio. The
United States sought and received an injunction against such conduct as a violation of the
antitrust laws. The Court held that the injunction did not amount to an unconstitutional prior
restraint: since the antitrust laws apply to competitors in all businesses-communications
included-an injunction was just as appropriate a means of enforcing those laws against
publishers as against other violators. Id. at 155-56.
The point here is not that Carroll and Lorain Journal are somehow indicative of a clear
conceptual distinction in which some injunctions of communication become "prior restraints"
of expression and others do not. On the contrary, they merely illustrate the more general point
that not all procedures for injunction of potentially protected speech are constitutionally
invalid. Professor Emerson's study of the development and scope of the doctrine led him to
comment that "[d]espite an ancient and celebrated history, the doctrine of prior restraint
remains today curiously confused and unformed." Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 649 (1955). It is no wonder, then, that the courts have relied
primarily on historic definitions of prior restraint to give shape to the concept. See note 119
infra and accompanying text.
118. See note 117 supra.
119. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
389-90 (1973); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931); Emerson, supra
note 117, at 650-52.
120. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 389-90 (1973).
121. In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), the challenged impediment to
communication also took the form of an injunction under which future violations would be
punished by way of subsequent citation for contempt. The Court nevertheless held that the
injunction operated as an invalid prior restraint since, in order to avoid citation for contempt,
the newspaper would have to clear future publications with a judge. Id. at 712-13. The
characterization of the Minnesota statute as a system of prior restraint thus conflicts with the
traditional understanding of that concept. See notes 119-20 supra and accompanying text.
Near, however, does not mandate the conclusion that the procedure for enjoining commercial
speech under section 53(a) constitutes a prior restraint of expression. In Near, the invalidated
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result, it is doubtful that the first amendment requires the FTC to overcome a
"heavy presumption" against the constitutionality of the section 53(a)
procedure each time it seeks a preliminary injunction against a misleading
advertisement. 122
Further support for this conclusion is drawn from the Ninth Circuit's
treatment of a statutory temporary injunction procedure utilized by another
agency. As previously noted, the NLRB is authorized to seek temporary
injunctive relief against unfair labor practices pending termination of its
administrative proceedings. 123 Some of the unfair practices prohibited by the
statute authorized an injunction against any newspaper which had been found guilty of publish-
ing "malicious, scandalous [or] defamatory" material from publishing any such material in the
future; a publisher could defend by proving that his publications were true and published "with
good motives and for justifiable ends." Id. at 702-03. The Court's concern in Near focused on
the broad, vague nature of the restraint which might be placed upon publication. Id. at 712-13.
Indeed, a "malicious publication" was not even defined by the statute. Id. at 712.
Contrast this with the procedure for enjoining false advertisements under section 53(a). It
has already been noted that the truth of commercial speech is more readily verified by
advertisers, agencies and courts than is that of other types of speech. See note 101 supra and
accompanying text. Further, there is no reason why an injunction granted under section 53(a)
might not be precisely and narrowly drawn so as to inform the respondent exactly what sort of
communication (advertisement) was being prohibited. The potential for unconstitutional "chill-
ing" of legitimate speech, which appeared to be great in the Minnesota statute involved in
Near, is negligible under section 53(a). Finally, it should be noted that the Court's most recent
treatment of the prior restraint doctrine defined it in narrow terms and characterized its
expression in Near as aberrant. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389-90 (1973).
122. Even if the procedure for obtaining a temporary injunction under section 53(a) is
characterized as a "system of prior restraints," the presumption against its constitutionality
might be overcome by the FTC. In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), the Supreme
Court held that the heavy presumption was met in the case of a non-criminal proceeding
requiring prior submission of films to an administrative censor, where: (1) the burden of proving
that a film is unprotected expression rested on the censor; (2) any restraint prior to a final
determination on the merits was limited to a preservation of the status quo for the shortest time
compatible with sound judicial procedure; and (3) a prompt final judicial determination of
obscenity was assured. Id. at 57-59. Restraint of false or misleading commercial speech
pursuant to section 53(a) may well satisfy these standards. The burden of proof in the section
53(a) proceeding and in the final proceeding on the merits is on the FTC. A section 53(a)
injunction necessarily preserves the status quo (but see note 46 supra) and is effective only
until the Commission reaches a decision on the merits of its complaint against the advertiser.
Finally, a decision on the merits adverse to the advertiser is reviewable in the courts of appeals,
15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). However, it is important to note that in construing the second and third
requirements of Freedman, the Supreme Court has required that the period of time for which
the prior restraint is to last and within which a final judicial determination on the merits is to be
had be fixed and brief. Thus, in Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968) (per curiam),
the Court struck down a city obscenity censorship procedure which required initiation of the
final judicial proceeding within 57 days of the beginning of the administrative restraint. The
period of time specified simply was not brief enough. Id. at 141-42. Obviously, the section 53(a)
procedure does not meet this requirement. Since the procedure contemplated under section
53(a) begins with a judicial proceeding, however, it is unclear whether the Court would expect
the Freedman-Teitel requirements to be met exactly.
123. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
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National Labor Relations Act relate to labor picketing. 124 Though picketing
is said to involve elements of both speech and conduct, 1' it is well estab-
lished that peaceful picketing, conducted in areas open to the general public,
is protected by the first amendment. 126 Nevertheless, in Department and
Specialty Store Employees Local 1265 v. Brown,127 the Ninth Circuit held
that the NLRB's demonstration of reasonable cause to believe that the
union's "recognitional" picketing activities constituted unfair labor prac-
tices was sufficient to entitle the Board to an injunction against the picket-
ing. 128 This was so, the court held, even though the picketing in question
may have been "informational and advisory to the extent of being permissi-
ble under this legislation."' 129 The court did not characterize the procedure
as a prior restraint carrying a strong presumption against its constitutional-
ity.130 The preliminary injunction was granted upon a showing of reasonable
cause to believe that prohibited activities were occurring even though the
same activities were, to the extent that the picketing was informational and
not recognitional, protected by the first amendment.
With its decision in Simeon the Ninth Circuit appears to have also
retreated from its position in Department Store Employees. Since there is
nothing in the statutes themselves or in the case law interpreting them which
suggests that Congress meant to impose different burdens on the NLRB and
the FTC,131 it is difficult to determine why the Ninth Circuit now expects the
FTC to demonstrate a favorable balance of the equities and a likelihood of
success on the merits when it seeks a temporary injunction against deceptive
advertising.
Since the various statutory injunction procedures do not constitute prior
restraints within the strict meaning of that concept, there is no first amend-
ment reason to require the agencies to overcome an especially heavy pre-
sumption when they seek relief under those provisions. This is not to say, of
course, that the standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Rhodes Phar-
macal imposes no restrictions at all on an agency's ability to enjoin com-
mercial expression. Regardless of its characterization, the reasonable-cause-
124. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970).
125. See Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313 (1968).
126. Id. at 313. This broad statement is qualified by the illegal object doctrine: "a State, in
enforcing some public policy, whether of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by
its legislature or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing
effectuation of that policy." International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 293
(1957). The seminal case in this area is Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (striking down
on first amendment grounds a state statute flatly prohibiting picketing).
127. 284 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 934 (1961).
128. 284 F.2d at 628.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See notes 49-55 supra and accompanying text.
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to-believe standard does not permit the state to halt the dissemination of an
advertisement at will. 132 In each case, the Commission must demonstrate the
reasonableness of its substantive complaint against the advertiser. The
Simeon requirement of showing likely success on the merits, on the other
hand, risks turning the application for a temporary injunction into a ritualis-
tic "contest of oaths" through which a respondent may be allowed to
continue dissemination of an allegedly false advertisement merely by ap-
pearing before the court and denying the full substance of the Commission's
complaint. 33 The first amendment requires no such result. 34 Given the
greater amenability of commercial speech to objective verification for accu-
racy, its greater durability in the face of regulation, and its relatively
non-controversial nature (at least by comparison with unpopular political
speech), the procedural safeguard afforded by the reasonable-cause-to-
believe standard should be held sufficient under the first amendment.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Simeon that the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act requires more than a showing of reasonable cause to believe in
order for the Commission to obtain a preliminary injunction under section
132. In FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963), the FTC sought a temporary
injunction against an aspirin manufacturer advertising the results of a "scientific investigation"
of the leading analgesic products. The Commission alleged that the advertisements implied that
the results of the investigation, which were favorable to respondent's product, were endorsed
by the U.S. government and the AMA, when they actually were not so endorsed. The court of
appeals upheld the lower court's finding that the advertisement was not necessarily misleading,
and its conclusion that the FTC had not demonstrated a reasonable cause to believe that the
FTC Act was being violated (though the court also specifically refused to adopt this as the
correct standard; see note 29 supra).
133. See note 22 supra. Again, it is not being argued here that the agencies will never be able
to meet the more difficult standard. See FTC v. National Health Aids, 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md.
1952), where the more difficult standard was in fact met by the FTC. However, that a
respondent may be able to frustrate prompt enforcement efforts by appearing in court with a
full set of denials is also a real possibility. See, e.g., FTC v. American Medicinal Prods., 30
F.T.C. 1683 (S.D. Cal. 1940). See note 23 supra.
- 134. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976). See also Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949). There, petitioner
sought an injunction against enforcement by the Postmaster General of a postal fraud order as
entered against petitioner pursuant to 39 U.S.C. §§ 259, 732 (current version at 39 U.S.C. § 4005
(1970)). That statute, see note 115 supra, authorized the Postmaster General to order the return
of all mail sent to any person "upon evidence satisfactory to" him that the latter is conducting
fraudulent moneymaking schemes through the U.S. mail. Petitioner sought to counter damaging
testimony by the government's medical witnesses by producing an authority of his own whose
testimony corroborated the claims he had made in advertisements extolling the efficacy and
safety of his weight-reducing plan. The Court upheld the Postmaster General's decision to
disregard the latter testimony and issue the fraud order, noting that there was no requirement-
constitutional or statutory-that the order be withheld anytime "medical witnesses can be
produced who blindly adhere to views discredited by scientific experience." 338 U.S. at 274
(dictum).
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53(a) is unsupportable. It ignores the clear intent of Congress to provide an
effective and immediate means of halting potentially injurious violations of
substantive provisions of the Act. It also suggests a new reading of other
federal statutes dealing with deceptive commercial transactions which
would limit the availability of the preliminary injunction as an enforcement
tool for the NLRB, the SEC and the ICC.
The result in Simeon is not required by the first amendment's protec-
tion of commercial speech. In recognition of the special character of com-
mercial speech, the Supreme Court has adopted a balancing test to evaluate
government regulation in the economic sphere. The application of this
approach in the commercial speech cases reflects the Court's appreciation of
the government's strong interest in stifling fraudulent transactions in all
contexts. Since the first amendment does not require the agencies to dem-
onstrate more than reasonable cause to believe that a fraudulent transaction
is occurring, it is surely best from an enforcement perspective that the
issuance of a temporary injunction be conditioned on no more burdensome a
showing. In this way the offending party will not profit, at the public's
expense, from the often unavoidable delays which frequently characterize
administrative enforcement proceedings.
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